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I. Introduction
Imagine that you are an attorney in New Jersey and a client walks into your office with the
following issue: the client has been employed by the same employer for the past five years during
which time he has been subjected to a hostile work environment. Specifically, he has been exposed
to derogatory language; received reprimands for minor infractions while fellow employees commit
major infractions that go unpunished; and is assigned menial tasks and assignments while other
less-qualified employees are given better career opportunities. Under the current state of the law
in New Jersey, these types of acts, if tied to a protected class, can make up a hostile work
environment and are actionable under New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”). If
the acts are tied to the employee’s whistleblowing activity, then they are also actionable under
New Jersey’s Conscientious Employee Protection Act (“CEPA”).

And, under the courts’

interpretation of these statutes, even acts occurring outside of the statute of limitations are
actionable under the continuing violation doctrine for a hostile work environment claim.
But what would happen if the client’s employer failed to promote him, or denied him a
transfer? If either of those events occurred outside of the statute of limitations, your client would
be barred from bringing a claim because the courts treat those actions as discrete acts, as opposed
to a hostile work environment, and refuse to include them under the continuing violation doctrine.
“The overarching goal” of NJLAD, which reflects the clear public policy of the State, “is nothing
less than the eradication ‘of the cancer of discrimination’” in the workplace.1 Similarly, the
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purpose of CEPA is to “protect and encourage employees to report illegal or unethical workplace
activities and to discourage public and private sector employers from engaging in such conduct.”2
Thus, CEPA must be considered remedial in nature and “should be construed liberally to effectuate
its important social goal.”3 To stay true to the purpose and goals of theses statutes, New Jersey’s
Legislature should amend the statutes to allow for the aggregation of “discrete acts” for statute of
limitation purposes.
The important difference between the two types of acts is how the courts treat them for
purposes of the applicable statute of limitations. Courts have ruled that discrete acts cannot be
aggregated under the continuing violation doctrine, while repeated acts of harassment or retaliation
can be brought into a claim even if many of the acts occurred outside of the statute of limitations
period.4
The difference in the way the courts handle these situations is the focus of this Comment.
Part II will review the background of NJLAD and New Jersey’s CEPA. Part III will discuss the
Supreme Court’s Decision in National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan,5 which was
the impetus for New Jersey’s adoption of the discrete acts, as opposed to hostile work environment,
application to the statute of limitations under NJLAD and CEPA. Part IV will discuss the New
Jersey cases that adopted the Morgan framework and the outcomes of each. Specifically, the cases
of Shepherd v. Hunterdon Developmental Center,6 Roa v. Roa,7 and Green v. Jersey City Board
of Education8 will be discussed through the analytical framework applied by the courts. Part V
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Abbamont v. Piscataway Tp. Bd. Of Educ., 650 A.2d 958, 971 (N.J. 1994) (citing Judiciary, Law and Public Safety
Committee, Statement on Assembly Bills No. 2872, 2118, 2228 (1990)).
3
Id.
4
See Nat’l Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002).
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6
Shepherd v. Hunterdon Developmental Ctr., 803 A.2d 611 (N.J. 2002).
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will explore hypothetical situations which cause confusion among lower courts in determining
what constitutes a discrete act for purposes of applying the continuing violation doctrine. Miller
v. Beneficial Management Corporation,9 which overturned a lower court’s summary judgment
finding that a failure to promote claim was a discrete act as a matter of law instead of allowing a
jury to decide the issue, will supplement the discussion of the hypothetical situations. Part VI will
recommend statutory amendments to both NJLAD and CEPA which would eliminate the courts’
differentiation of certain types of acts for purposes of applying the statute of limitations.
Specifically, it will call on the New Jersey Legislature to allow for the aggregation of all acts of
discrimination or retaliation that are substantially related to the underlying statutory-defined
protected status, in the case of NJLAD, or in the case of a CEPA claim, in relation to the
whistleblowing activity. Finally, Part VII will briefly conclude.
II. Background of NJLAD and CEPA
This section begins in subpart A. with a brief history of NJLAD along with a discussion of
the act’s legislative history and purpose. Subpart B. then discusses the history and purpose of New
Jersey’s CEPA.
A. The History and Purpose of NJLAD
NJLAD was enacted in 1945, nearly twenty years prior to the federal Civil Rights Act of
1964.10 Its purpose is to eradicate discrimination on defined bases, whether intentional or
unintentional.11 The New Jersey Legislature has amended NJLAD throughout its history as
required by the ever-changing landscape to ensure that its overarching goal of “eradicat[ing] . . .

9
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the cancer of discrimination” is met.12 NJLAD is considered remedial legislation13 and should be
read with an approach sympathetic to its objectives.14 NJLAD was “enacted to protect not only
the civil rights of individual aggrieved employees but also to protect the public’s strong interest in
a discrimination-free workplace.”15 In order to achieve this goal, NJLAD expressly prohibits an
employer from discriminating against an employee based on specified enumerated statutory
characteristics, such as: race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, age, sex, gender identity or
expression, affectional or sexual orientation, marital status, familial status, liability for service in
the Armed Forces of the United States, disability or nationality.16
Since its inception, New Jersey courts have construed NJLAD’s text liberally to achieve
its aims.17 NJLAD is thus a cornerstone of our fundamental social and political philosophy that
demands protection from casual or unintended erosion. Indeed, NJLAD’s entire legislative history
has demonstrated a continual enlargement of the Division on Civil Rights’ power and jurisdiction
to enable it more readily to discharge its responsibilities in the quest for a just society.18 The
judicial construction of NJLAD has been concomitantly liberal and to the same end.19
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Gardenhire v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 754 A.2d 1244, 1248 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2000) (quoting Dale v. Boy Scouts
of Am., 734 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1999)).
13
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1624 (10th ed. 2014) (“1. Any statute other than a private bill; a law providing a means
to enforce rights or redress injuries. 2. A statute enacted to correct one or more defects, mistakes, or omissions.”).
14
Nat’l Org. for Women v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 318 A.2d 33 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974).
15
Hoag v. Brown, 935 A.2d 1218, 1226 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (quoting Lehman v. Toys ‘R’ Us, 626 A.2d
445, 452 (N.J. 1992)).
16
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inhabitants, because of race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, age, sex, gender identity or expression, affectional
or sexual orientation, marital status, familial status, liability for service in the Armed Forces of the United States,
disability or nationality, are matters of concern to the government of the State, and that such discrimination threatens
not only the rights and proper privileges of the inhabitants of the State but menaces the institutions and foundation of
a free democratic State; provided, however, that nothing in this expression of policy prevents the making of legitimate
distinctions between citizens and aliens when required by federal law or otherwise necessary to promote the national
interest.”).
17
Zive v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 867 A.2d 1133, 1138 (N.J. 2005) (citing Franek v. Tomahawk Lake Resort, 754 A.2d
1237, 1243 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000)).
18
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-6.
19
Hinfey v. Matawan Regional Bd. of Ed., 371 A.2d 78, 81 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977).
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NJLAD does not contain its own statute of limitations for bringing a civil suit.20 Courts
therefore differed as to whether the statute of limitations for NJLAD claims was two years or six
years.21 But in 1993, in Montells v. Haynes, the New Jersey Supreme Court established that the
statute of limitations for civil actions under NJLAD is two years, in keeping with the New Jersey
statute of limitations for personal injury, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2.22
B. The History and Purpose of CEPA
In 1986, New Jersey enacted CEPA to provide extensive protection against retaliatory
action directed at employees engaged in a broad range of whistleblowing activities.23 Consistent
with the breadth of the statute, the New Jersey Supreme Court liberally construed CEPA's
provisions to further its remedial purpose of protecting employees who refuse to engage in illegal
activity, or “blow the whistle” on employer illegality or corruption. In a series of opinions
interpreting CEPA, the court broadened the scope of the statute in terms of public policy, the
employer conduct prohibited by the law, and the justifications employees need to blow the whistle

20

See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-3 et seq.
See, e.g., Lautenslager v. Supermarkets General Corp., 600 A.2d 525 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1991) (six-year statute of
limitations); White v. Johnson & Johnson Products, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 3d (D.N.J. 1989) (two-year statute of
limitations).
22
Montells v. Haynes, 627 A.2d 654 (N.J. 1993).
23
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-3 (2019) (The relevant substantive section (section 3) is as follows: “3. An employer shall
not take any retaliatory action against an employee because the employee does any of the following: a. Discloses, or
threatens to disclose to a supervisor or to a public body an activity, policy or practice of the employer or another
employer, with whom there is a business relationship, that the employee reasonably believes is in violation of a law,
or a rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to law, or, in the case of an employee who is a licensed or certified health
care professional, reasonably believes constitutes improper quality of patient care; b. Provides information to, or
testifies before, any public body conducting an investigation, hearing or inquiry into any violation of law, or a rule or
regulation promulgated pursuant to law by the employer or another employer, with whom there is a business
relationship, or, in the case of an employee who is a licensed or certified health care professional, provides information
to, or testifies before, any public body conducting an investigation, hearing or inquiry into the quality of patient care;
or c. Objects to, or refuses to participate in any activity, policy or practice which the employee reasonably believes:
(1) is in violation of a law, or a rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to law or, if the employee is a licensed or
certified health care professional, constitutes improper quality of patient care; (2) is fraudulent or criminal; or (3) is
incompatible with a clear mandate of public policy concerning the public health, safety or welfare or protection of the
environment.”).
21
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on their employers.24 The purpose of CEPA is to protect and encourage employees to report illegal
or unethical workplace activities and to discourage public and private sector employers from
engaging in such conduct, and thus, CEPA must be considered remedial in nature and should be
construed liberally to effectuate its important social goal.25
The statute of limitations for a CEPA claim is one year.26 Unlike Title VII,27 the limitations
period begins to run upon the occurrence of the retaliatory action and not when the plaintiff learns
that a retaliatory action will take place; for example, the CEPA statute of limitations begins to run
as of the employee’s last day of work, rather than when he learned of his discharge.28 When there
is continued retaliatory conduct, the statute of limitations runs from the final act of retaliation.29
The Third Circuit, however, has held that the “continuing violation” toll on CEPA’s statute of
limitation does not apply where the plaintiff’s claims are individually actionable, discrete events
under the test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in AMTRAK v. Morgan.30
III. The United States Supreme Court’s Decision in Morgan
This section will discuss the United States Supreme Court’s seminal case which
distinguishes between discriminatory hostile work environment claims and separate, discrete acts

24

Michael J. Garrison, Limiting The Protection For Employees From Compelled Noncompete Agreements Under State
Whistleblower Laws: A Critical Analysis Of Maw v. Advanced Clinical Communications, 20 THE LABOR LAW 257,
274 (2005). See, e.g., Mehlman v. Mobil Oil Corp., 153 N.J. 163 (1998) (employee is not required to have specific
knowledge of the precise source of public policy at the time he or she objects to it); Estate of Roach v. TRW, Inc.,
164 N.J. 598 (2000) (court rejected a limited reading of CEPA that would have required a whistleblower to
demonstrate that the reported illegality “implicates the public interest”).
25
Abbamont v. Piscataway Tp. Bd. Of Educ., 650 A.2d 958, 971 (N.J. 1994).
26
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-5; see also Beck v. Tribert, 711 A.2d 951, 956–957 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998),
cert. denied, 719 A.2d 1022 (1998).
27
See Alderiso v. Medical Ctr. of Ocean County, Inc., 770 A.2d 275, 280–81 (N.J. 2001).
28
See id.; see also Keelan v. Bell Commc’ns Research, 674 A.2d 603, 607–608 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996)
(finding that the employer’s notice to the plaintiff that he would be terminated was not a sufficient retaliatory action
to trigger the statute of limitations).
29
See Green v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ., 828 A.2d 883 (N.J. 2003); see also Marrero v. Wimalawansa, 2013 N.J.
Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1693 at *6–7 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jul. 9, 2013), cert. denied, 82 A.3d 939 (N.J. 2013)
(holding that the “continuing violation” doctrine does not preserve otherwise time-barred CEPA claims from the
earlier of two separate periods of employment); O’Connor v. City of Newark, 440 F.3d 125, 130–31 (3d Cir. 2006).
30
See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. (AMTRAK) v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002).
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of discrimination or retaliation to determine if a complaint is timely filed. Subpart A. presents the
facts and procedural history of Morgan; the majority opinion is discussed in subpart B.
A. Facts and Procedural History
Abner Morgan, Jr. sued his employer, National Railroad Passenger Corporation
(“Amtrak”), under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.31 Amtrak hired Morgan, a black
male, in August 1990.32

He alleged he was the victim of discrete and retaliatory acts of

discrimination and was exposed to a racially hostile work environment throughout his
employment.33 Amtrak's alleged racially motivated discrimination against Morgan began when
he was hired as an electrician's helper, rather than as an electrician.34 Although previously trained
and experienced in electrical work, Morgan was the only person ever hired as a “helper” at his
location of employment.35 Other alleged acts included reprimands and termination for refusing to
follow orders, Amtrak refusing to allow him to participate in an apprenticeship program, written
and verbal reprimands for days taken off from work, and the use of “racial epithets” against him
by his managers.36
On February 27, 1995, Morgan filed a discrimination and retaliation charge against Amtrak
with the EEOC and also with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing.37 In
his Complaint, Morgan alleged that during the nearly five years he worked for Amtrak, he suffered
harsh discipline and harassment because of his race from his supervisors.38 While many of
Morgan's alleged discriminatory events took place within 300 days of the time he filed an EEOC

31

Morgan, 536 U.S. at 104.
Id. at 105 n.1.
33
Id. at 105.
34
Id. at 105 n.1.
35
Morgan v. AMTRAK, 232 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 2000).
36
Id. at 1013.
37
Morgan, 536 U.S. at 106.
38
Id.
32
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claim, many alleged acts also took place before the 300-day filing period.39 Morgan was
terminated by Amtrak on March 3, 1995.40 The EEOC issued a “Notice of Right to Sue” on July
3, 1996, and Morgan filed his lawsuit on October 2, 1996.41
Morgan originally brought suit against Amtrak in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California alleging that he experienced discrimination, retaliation, and
suffered exposure to a hostile work environment because of his race.42 In response, Amtrak filed
a motion for summary judgment relating to all incidents occurring more than 300 days before
Morgan filed his EEOC charge.43
The District Court granted Amtrak partial summary judgment and ruled Amtrak was not
liable for conduct that occurred before May 3, 1994, because that conduct fell outside the 300-day
filing period.44 Thus, Amtrak was held responsible only for alleged discriminatory conduct
occurring 300 days, or approximately ten months, before Morgan filed his administrative charge
on February 27, 1995, but not for any events that took place before May 3, 1994.45 The remaining
timely-filed claims proceeded to trial, resulting in a jury verdict in favor of Amtrak.46 Morgan
appealed the District Court's summary judgment ruling and the jury verdict judgment to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals,47 which considered each of Morgan's three types of Title VII claims
separately.48 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the pre-limitations conduct in all three claims was
sufficiently related to the post-limitations acts to apply the continuing violation doctrine.49 It held

39

Id. at 102.
Id. at 115 n.8.
41
Id. at 106.
42
Morgan, 232 F.3d at 1010.
43
Morgan, 536 U.S. at 106.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 107 n.2.
47
Id. at 106.
48
Id. at 107.
49
Morgan, 536 U.S. at 108.
40
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that the District Court should have allowed certain events occurring in the pre-limitations period
to be put before the jury for liability purposes.50 The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's
ruling and remanded the case for a new trial.51 Because of a split in circuit decisions,52 the Supreme
Court granted certiorari on the issues in this case.53
B. Majority Opinion
The Morgan Court first reversed the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ holding that charges
for discrete discriminatory acts must be filed within the appropriate 180- or 300-day filing period
as required by the EEOC.54 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit applied the continuing violations
doctrine to what it termed “serial violations,” holding that so long as one act falls within the charge
filing period, discriminatory and retaliatory acts that are plausibly or sufficiently related to that act
may also be considered for the purposes of liability.55 The Court went on to define discrete acts
as including “termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire” as easily
identifiable.56 As such, these types of acts constitute separate “actionable ‘unlawful employment
practice[s].’”57
The Court then affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s ruling on Morgan’s hostile work environment
claims.58 In so doing, the Court found that “hostile environment claims are different in kind from
discrete acts” because “[t]heir very nature involves repeated conduct.”59 Therefore, unlike discrete

50

Id.
Id.
52
Id. at 106 (District Court employed the test established by the Seventh Circuit in Galloway v. General Motors); see
also id. at 107 n. 3 (where the Fifth Circuit employs a multi-factor test).
53
Id.
54
Id. at 113.
55
Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 121.
59
Id. at 115.
51
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acts, hostile environment claims do not “occur on any particular day,” but rather occur over a
period of time with no one act necessarily being considered actionable on its own.60
To reconcile treating the two types of acts differently, the majority opinion, authored by
Justice Thomas, interpreted “unlawful employment practice” in the statute “to apply to a discrete
act or single ‘occurrence,’ even when it has a connection to other acts.”61 To determine whether
an actionable hostile work environment claims exists, the Court will look to “the frequency of the
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere
offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work
performance.”62 The Court then held that a hostile work environment claim was composed of a
series of separate acts that collectively constitute one “unlawful employment practice.”63
The majority opinion thereby treats two similarly situated employees, who have suffered
discrimination or retaliation, differently for purposes of when they are required to file claims. One
who suffers a loss of promotion due to discrimination or retaliation is forced to file within the
statutory time period (even if they suffer other acts of retaliation or discrimination that the court
does not deem “discrete”), while one who suffers minor, but repeated, discriminatory acts has the
option to wait and is not barred from claiming each act as one “unlawful employment practice,”
even if some of the acts occurred outside of the statutory time period. This issue will be discussed
further throughout the remainder of this Comment.
IV. The New Jersey Supreme Court’s Adoption of the Morgan Framework

60

Id.
Morgan, 536 U.S. at 111; see, e.g., Elec. Workers v. Robbins & Myers, 429 U.S. 229, 234 (1976) (wherein an
employee asserted that his complaint was timely filed because the date “the alleged unlawful employment practice
occurred” was the date after the conclusion of a grievance arbitration procedure, rather than the earlier date of his
discharge. The discharge, he contended, was “tentative” and “nonfinal” until the grievance and arbitration procedure
ended. Not so, the Court concluded, because the discriminatory act occurred on the date of discharge—the date that
the parties understood the termination to be final.).
62
Morgan, 536 U.S. at 116 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)).
63
Id. at 117.
61
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This section explores three cases decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court that adopt the
Morgan framework when analyzing workplace discrimination and retaliation causes of action.
Subpart A. is a brief discussion of the case wherein the New Jersey Supreme Court officially
adopted the Morgan framework. Subpart B. reviews the purpose of a statute of limitations and the
judicially created equitable exception, the continuing violation doctrine. Subparts C. and D.
discuss two New Jersey Supreme Court cases to show how the courts analyze claims of workplace
discrimination and retaliation for purposes of the statute of limitations.
A. Shepherd v. Hunterdon Developmental Center
In Shepherd, two plaintiffs alleged illegal retaliation in that they had been subjected to a
continuous pattern of ill-treatment after they supported a co-worker’s discrimination lawsuit, and
they asserted, among other things, hostile work environment claims.64

Defendants sought

dismissal, arguing that plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred because they had known that they had
been discriminated against when they sent a detailed letter about their claims to their
superintendent two years and 26 days before they filed their complaint.65 Despite noting that
federal precedent is only a guide for NJLAD claims, Justice Peter Verniero, writing for the
majority, explained there was a benefit in having New Jersey law “mirror the approach taken in
Morgan to avoid further confusion in an already complicated area of law.”66 As a result, New
Jersey’s Supreme Court expressly adopted Morgan’s distinction between discrete act and
continuing course of conduct discrimination for NJLAD claims.67 Applying that analytical
framework, Justice Verniero found that, because the plaintiffs had identified one timely act and

64

Shepherd v. Hunterdon Developmental Ctr., 803 A.2d 611 (N.J. 2002).
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
65

11

had asserted a continuing course of conduct which included that timely act, their claims were
timely.68
B. Statutes of Limitations and the Continuing Violation Doctrine
One hundred years ago, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. asked, “What is the justification for
depriving a man of his rights, a pure evil as far as it goes, in consequence of the lapse of time?”69
The law of limitation of actions is the set of legislatively and judicially created legal rules—
including the classification of claims, the duration of limitation periods, the applicable principles
of accrual and tolling, and the like—that determine whether a claim is time-barred.70 In 1944, the
Supreme Court, in Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., stated,
Statutes of limitation . . . . are designed to promote justice by preventing surprises
through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has
been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared. The theory is that
even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend
within the period of limitation and the right to be free of stale claims in time comes
to prevail over the right to prosecute them.71
New Jersey recognizes an important continuing violations exception to the NJLAD statute
of limitations.72 “When an individual is subject to a continual, cumulative pattern of tortuous
conduct, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the wrongful action ceases.”73 For
example, discrimination in wages may be a continuing violation.74 A plaintiff's hostile work
environment claim can proceed under a continuing violations theory if at least one of the acts in a
series falls within the statute of limitations.75 The continuing violation theory is a judicially created

68

Id.
Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 476 (1897).
70
Tyler T. Ochoa and Andrew Wistrich, The Puzzling Purposes of Statutes of Limitation, 28 PAC. L. J. 453 (1997).
71
Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348 (1944).
72
See Shepherd v. Hunterdon Developmental Ctr., 803 A.2d 611, 620–24 (N.J. 2002).
73
Wilson v. Wal-Mart Stores, 729 A.2d 1006, 1010 (N.J. 1999).
74
See Decker v. Elizabeth Bd. of Ed., 380 A.2d 285, 287 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977), cert. denied, 384 A.2d 842
(N.J. 1978).
75
See Caggiano v. Fontoura, 804 A.2d 1193, 1207 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002).
69
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equitable exception to the statute of limitations in employment discrimination and harassment
cases. It is used when a plaintiff argues that unlawful acts that began outside the statute of
limitations period actually “continued” within the statutory period and that the timely acts should
resurrect the time-barred acts.76
The Appellate Division has adopted a three-factor analysis articulated by the Third Circuit
to be used to determine whether a plaintiff's claim can survive a statute of limitations bar under
the continuing violations theory.77 Courts are directed to consider the subject matter of the
violation/discrimination, the frequency, and the degree of permanence.78 “If, however, a plaintiff
knew, or with exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that each was discriminatory,
the plaintiff ‘may not sit back and accumulate all the discriminatory acts and sue on all within the
statutory period applicable to the last one.’”79 In the instances of continuing violations, if a timely
complaint is filed as to current violations, prior (otherwise time-barred) acts may be litigated.80
Damages are not restricted to only those violations that occurred within the timely filing period.81
Discrete acts of discrimination or retaliation are those acts that occur on the day they
happened. A discrete act is one that allows a plaintiff to be aware of the act when it occurs and is
completed upon one’s awareness of it taking place.82 Discrete acts of discrimination, such as a
failure to hire, a failure to promote, a demotion, or a discharge, are considered to provide a plaintiff

76

See Shepherd, 803 A.2d at 611.
See Rush v. Scott Specialty Gases, Inc., 113 F.3d 474, 481 (3d Cir. 1997); Bolinger v. Bell Atl., 749 A.2d 857, 861
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000); Hall v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 777 A.2d 1002, 1010–11 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001),
cert. denied, 754 A.2d 1211 (N.J. 2000).
78
Hall, 777 A.2d at 1011 (internal citations omitted); Bolinger, 749 A.2d at 862.
79
Id. (quoting Moskowitz v. Tr. of Purdue Univ., 5 F.3d 279, 282 (7th Cir.1993)) (holding that an age-discrimination
claim based on the denial of suitable laboratory space was actionable at the time it occurred and would not be
considered part of later discriminatory conduct).
80
Id. at 1010.
81
Terry v. Mercer Cty. Freeholders Board, 414 A.2d 30, 32 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980), aff'd as modified, 430
A.2d 194 (N.J. 1981) (180-day filing requirement is not a restriction on damages; relief may be granted from date of
earliest discrimination).
82
See Nat’l Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110 (2002).
77
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sufficient notice of an NJLAD violation, and therefore, a separate limitations period begins to run
from each such discriminatory act.83 Hostile work environment claims, on the other hand, consist
of repeated harassing acts over a period of time that collectively constitute a single unlawful
employment practice under NJLAD.84
C. Differentiating Discrete Acts of Retaliation from a Series of Acts of Retaliation for Purposes of
Applying the Continuing Violation Doctrine
In Roa v. Roa, the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed the type of retaliatory conduct
that is considered discrete, and therefore not entitled to application of the continuing violation
doctrine. In 2003, plaintiffs Fernando and Liliana Roa worked for Gonzales and Tapanes Foods,
Inc. (“G&T”) where Marino Roa, Fernando’s brother, supervised the plaintiffs.85 Marino was
romantically involved with two female subordinates, one of whom left a gift for Marino on
Valentine’s Day.86 Marino asked Fernando to lie and claim the gift was for him.87 Fernando did
so initially, but eventually told Marino’s wife the truth.88 In response, plaintiffs allege that Marino
began to harass and threaten them, culminating with their termination.89
G&T terminated Liliana’s employment on August 24, 2003.90 On September 15, 2003,
she received notice that she was ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits because the
company had stated that her termination was due to misconduct.91 Liliana successfully appealed

83
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that decision.92 On October 3, 2003, G&T terminated Fernando’s employment.93 While Fernando
was still employed by the company, Liliana underwent surgery that resulted in medical expenses
of approximately $6,000.94 Plaintiffs thought the expenses were covered by Fernando’s health
insurance, but on November 11, 2003, Fernando’s health insurer notified him that it would not pay
for the surgery because he was not covered at the time the medical services were rendered.95
Although the premature termination of Fernando’s health benefits eventually was corrected, the
insurer did not pay the claim until February 2004.96
Nonetheless, Liliana’s delay in receiving her unemployment compensation benefits and
medical benefits allegedly caused plaintiffs to suffer financial problems and stress.97

On

November 5, 2005, plaintiffs sued G&T and Marino, alleging, among other things, that the
company engaged in unlawful retaliation in violation of the NJLAD.98 The trial court granted
defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint on the basis of the NJLAD’s two-year statute of
limitations.99 Plaintiffs appealed to the Appellate Division, which agreed that Liliana’s claim was
time-barred.100 It pointed out that her discharge occurred in August 2003, and the latest alleged
retaliatory act occurred when she received notice of the Appellate Tribunal’s decision regarding
her unemployment compensation benefits in October 2003, more than two years prior to the filing
of the lawsuit.101 The Appellate Division, however, reversed the trial court’s dismissal of
Fernando’s retaliation claim, finding that his claim for post-discharge retaliation regarding the
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cancellation of his health insurance was timely filed in November 2005, if Fernando did not
become aware of the cancellation until November 2003.102 The claim was actionable even if the
conduct was not related to his “current or prospective employment.”103 Critically, the Appellate
Division found that the insurance cancellation could constitute the last in a series of retaliatory acts
under the continuing violations theory, thereby making Fernando’s October 2003 claim actionable
as well.104 Defendants appealed to the New Jersey Supreme Court.105
The two issues before the court were: (1) whether the post-discharge retaliatory act
(cancellation of insurance) constituted the last act in a continuing violation, thereby reviving the
untimely discharge claim; and (2) whether the post-discharge retaliation must relate to present or
future employment in order to be actionable.106 On the first issue, the court held that the limitations
clock begins to run from the date of the discrete retaliatory act—in this case, Fernando’s
discharge—and that post-discharge retaliatory conduct does not encompass or revive the untimely
discharge retaliation claim.107 In so holding, the court explained that the continuing violation
theory was developed to protect an employee from being time-barred from bringing claims arising
from a series of acts, where no single event alerted the employee to the existence of a claim, but
which together show a pattern of discrimination.108 The primary example would be acts which by
themselves would not support a lawsuit but, taken as a whole, could constitute a hostile work
environment.109 The court held here, however, that the continuing violations theory does not
permit the aggregation of discrete discriminatory acts, like a termination or refusal to promote, any

102

Id.
Roa, 985 A.2d at 1230.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id. at 1228.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 1233.
109
Roa, 985 A.2d at 1232.
103

16

one of which is significant enough to put the employee on notice of a possible claim.110 As a
result, a lawsuit based on a discrete act of discrimination or retaliation must be brought within two
years of the event, notwithstanding later actions that might rise to the level of a continuing
violation.111
With respect to the second issue, the court held that a discrete post-discharge act of
retaliation is independently actionable even if it does not relate to present or future employment.112
Therefore, the court found that Fernando could still pursue his cancellation of benefits retaliation
claim under the NJLAD.113 In so finding, the court recognized “the discovery rule,” which
postpones the accrual of a cause of action as long as the party did not know and reasonably could
not have been expected to know of the claim.114 In other words, the court recognized that Fernando
should be given the opportunity to prove that he was unaware of the cancellation of his insurance
until November 2003, which would make his post-discharge retaliation claim timely filed.
In deciding these issues, the court did not foreclose an employee’s use of untimely claims
as evidence to support the discrimination claim.115 Indeed, the court expressly stated that although
plaintiffs’ discharge claims were time-barred, they could be used at trial as evidence to demonstrate
conduct such as “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident when such matters are relevant to a material issue in dispute” in accordance
with the New Jersey Rules of Evidence.116
D. Application of the Continuing Violation Doctrine to a CEPA Claim
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In Green v. Jersey City Board of Education, the New Jersey Supreme Court applied the
continuing violation doctrine to a Plaintiff’s claim of retaliation under CEPA. Plaintiff Doris
Green was a science teacher in the Jersey City Public School system for the thirty-year period from
1967 to 1997.117 In 1994, she sought and obtained an assignment to Public School 22 because of
the teacher programs offered there.118 At Public School 22, Green participated in training
seminars and other non-classroom activities, including workshops in mediating student disputes
and increasing student interest in scholarships.119 She also attended a summer teachers' program
at the Stevens Institute of Technology (“Stevens Institute”), for which she received no
compensation, but which resulted in a $1,000 grant of computers and materials to her classroom.120
According to plaintiff, she was asked in May of 1995 by her supervisor and principal,
Cassandra Wiggins, to expect receipt of a check for more than $500 on behalf of another
employee.121 Wiggins explained to Green that the other teacher had supervised an after-school
program for which he did not have adequate credentials.122 Wiggins had submitted Green's name
and credentials to the District and was asking Green to give the money to Wiggins when she
received the check so that Wiggins could, in turn, ensure that the other teacher was compensated.123
Green refused to participate in this scheme because she believed it to be fraudulent or illegal.124
After informing Wiggins that she did not wish to receive the money on her colleague's behalf,
Green left Wiggins's office presuming that the matter was closed.125
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Two months later, however, Green received a check for $543.63 that she deposited in her
bank account, believing it to be payment for her participation in a mediation program.126 It was
not until Wiggins telephoned Green at home asking whether Green had received the check and
demanding payment that Green realized the check she had deposited was not money she had
earned.127 After the telephone call from Wiggins, Green brought the matter to the attention of the
Vice Principal of Public School 22, and then to Lorraine Casey Church, the payroll supervisor for
the Jersey City Board of Education.128 Green told Church that she wanted to return the money.
Church advised Green to have Wiggins call her and to send a check to the Board enclosing a letter
that explained the situation.129 Green followed Church's instructions and mailed a check to the
Board for $543.63 with a letter explaining that she had not participated in the program for which
she had been compensated.130 Green also requested that her name be removed from any list
naming her as a participant in that program.131 Subsequently, Church returned the check to Green
with a note informing her that Wiggins had authorized Green's receipt of a portion of the money
and that the difference would be taken out of Green's next paycheck.132 Green kept the remainder
of the money, again believing that it was for the mediation program.133 By the time of trial,
however, Green had become convinced that she was not entitled to any portion of the money.134
When the school year started the following September, Wiggins informed Green that she
was very angry with her for reporting the incident to Church and that Green would no longer be
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able to participate in the Stevens Institute program or the student mediation program.135 Green
was told that she was on Wiggins's “shit list” and that any requests Green made for additional
programs or training would be denied.136 A host of other retaliatory acts followed: Green was
given substandard evaluations even though her previous evaluations had been consistently
satisfactory; she was moved to a dilapidated classroom with inadequate furniture; she had trouble
getting necessary supplies; she was denied a key to the science lab; and her requests for
photocopying services were repeatedly rejected.137 In addition, Green's class was treated unfairly,
i.e., her students were no longer allowed to participate in opening exercises or in an honor roll
ceremony, or permitted to go on field trips.138 These incidents continued throughout two school
years, from September 1995 through the spring of 1997.139
In May 1997, Green left her teaching position and went on medical leave as a result of
persistent severe headaches and other physical symptoms she had been suffering since November
1996.140 Her psychiatrist has diagnosed her with a major depressive disorder, finding a causal
relationship between her work situation and her illness.141 She has never returned to teaching.142
On May 14, 1997, Green filed suit against the Jersey City Board of Education and several
individual defendants, including Cassandra Wiggins, alleging that defendants had engaged in
“continuous and increased forms of harassment” dating back to July 23, 1995.143 She contended
that defendants' behavior caused her loss of employment due to stress-related illness and that their
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harassing conduct amounted to a violation of her rights under CEPA.144 On the CEPA claim, the
jury returned a verdict against the Jersey City School Board, awarding plaintiff $265,000 in
compensatory damages and $300,000 in punitive damages.145

Defendant appealed and the

Appellate Division affirmed.146 Defendant petitioned for certification, in particular as to whether
Green's claim was barred by CEPA's one-year statute of limitations, and it was granted.147
CEPA defines actionable retaliation as “the discharge, suspension or demotion of an
employee, or other adverse employment action taken against an employee in the terms and
conditions of employment.”148 The statute further states that “[u]pon a violation of any of the
provisions of this act, an aggrieved employee or former employee may, within one year, institute
a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction.”149 The Jersey City Board of Education argued
that, because Green's complaint was filed on May 14, 1997, and the retaliatory conduct that she
alleged began in September 1995, her lawsuit was barred by the one-year statute of limitations.150
The New Jersey Supreme Court held that “[t]he policy concerns underpinning the
determination in Shepherd in respect of LAD claims require the application of the
Morgan/Shepherd framework in CEPA actions.”151 “Retaliation,” as defined by CEPA, need not
be a single discrete action.152 Indeed, “adverse employment action taken against an employee in
the terms and conditions of employment” can include, as it did in this case, many separate but
relatively minor instances of behavior directed against an employee that may not be actionable
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individually but that combine to make up a pattern of retaliatory conduct.153 Relying on the
majority opinion from Abbamont v. Piscataway Township Board of Education,154 the court held
that because the acts of retaliation against plaintiff continued until she resigned her teaching
position in May 1997, and because plaintiff filed her lawsuit on May 14, 1997, CEPA's one-year
statute of limitations did not bar her claim.155 Thus, both NJLAD and CEPA recognize adverse
employment actions that consist of relatively minor acts of harassing or hostile behavior that
together make up a pattern of retaliatory conduct that is actionable.
The foregoing cases reaffirm the New Jersey courts’ use of the Morgan framework when
determining the timeliness of claims filed under NJLAD and CEPA. Typically, a prima facie case
of unlawful discrimination in the workplace under the NJLAD is established when a plaintiff
demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she (1) belongs to a protected class;
(2) was performing a job at a level that met the employer's legitimate expectations; (3) suffered an
adverse employment action; and (4) others not within the protected class did not suffer similar
adverse employment actions.156 To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under CEPA, an
employee must establish (1) his reasonable belief that his employer’s conduct violated a law, rule,
or regulation, (2) whistleblowing activity, (3) adverse employment action, and (4) causal
connection between her whistleblowing activity and adverse employment action.157 The problem
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arises in these claims under the adverse employment action part of the rule. Specifically, when
the occurrence of the adverse employment action triggers the statute of limitations. The different
treatment afforded to complainants as to the timeliness of their claims will be discussed to further
show the unfairness of the current state of the laws.
V. Hypothetical and Miller v. Beneficial Management Corporation
This section begins in subpart A. with a summary of a Third Circuit case to help illuminate
how similarly situated claimants can be treated differently, for statute of limitations purposes,
based on the same type of workplace discrimination. Subpart B. continues with a hypothetical
situation that is resolved through the courts’ current interpretation of how claims of workplace
discrimination and/or retaliation are to be treated for statute of limitations purposes. These
differences generate unfair results and therefore undermine the legislative purpose of both the
NJLAD and CEPA, which leads to the final section’s discussion about ways to eliminate these
differences.
A. Miller v. Beneficial Management Corporation
Plaintiff Miller was employed as an attorney for defendant company and in 1984 joined
the Government Relations Department, where she replaced two attorneys who were terminated.158
One of those attorneys, Charles Walsh, was Vice President in Government Relations and the other
was assistant to the Vice President.159 When Miller joined the department in July 1984, she took
on the responsibilities of both previous attorneys, although without the accompanying title, at a
salary of $40,000 compared to Walsh’s salary of $55,000 and a year-end bonus of $28,500.160 In
June of 1985, Miller was promoted to Assistant Vice President (while still doing the work of the

158

Miller v. Beneficial Mgmt. Corp., 977 F.2d 834, 837 (3d Cir. 1992).
Id. at 836.
160
Id.
159

23

previous Vice President and Assistant Vice President) and her salary was increased to $47,300, far
below the salary of the male attorney who previously did the work she was now doing.161 Over
the next two years, Miller continuously asked her supervisor (Ward) to recommend her for a
promotion to Vice President.162 Although she was not promoted to that title, her salary in January
1987 was increased to $50,200 with a bonus of $8,000,163 (which was still significantly lower than
the bonus of the previous male Vice President she replaced).164 In May of 1988, Ward informed
Miller that she would never get the title of Vice President.165 Again, in September 1988, “Ward
told Miller that she would never become a Vice President.”166
On September 30, 1988, Miller called the previous Vice President, Walsh, who advised her
about his compensation before he was terminated, as well as the Assistant Vice President’s
compensation, both of which were higher than what Miller was being paid.167 On October 20,
1988, Miller was transferred to a different department, a transfer which became permanent on
December 14, 1988.168 Miller’s request for a promotion was officially denied by the Executive
Committee on December 22, 1988.169 Miller alleged she became aware at this time that she would
not be promoted.170 Miller’s employment with defendant ended on January 6, 1989.171
On February 27, 1989, Miller filed a charge of employment discrimination with the
EEOC.172 On July 20, 1989, Miller filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court of New Jersey
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alleging discrimination under the Equal Pay Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
NJLAD, and CEPA.173 Defendants moved for dismissal and/or summary judgment (the CEPA
claim was dismissed for lack of pendent jurisdiction) on all claims.174 The District Court granted
defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed Miller’s complaint with prejudice after
holding “that all of Miller’s federal claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations,
and also that defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the merits.”175
Miller appealed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.176 The main issue was determining
when the causes of action accrued in order to ascertain whether they were timely filed.177 The
District Court found that the statute of limitations on all of Miller’s claims began to run when she
first joined the Government Relations section in July 1984, claiming that “Miller had actual
knowledge of any alleged discrimination at the time she accepted and assumed the position.”178
Miller claimed she had no knowledge of the pay disparity until her conversation with Walsh on
September 30, 1988.179 Since Miller had to be aware of the alleged discriminatory act in order for
the statute of limitations to be triggered, the court found that summary judgment was inappropriate
as to the timeliness of her equal pay claims because a reasonable jury could find that Miller did
not know and should not have known of the pay disparity until her conversation with Walsh.180
As to her failure to promote claims, merely being told she would not be promoted to Vice President
was not enough to trigger the statute’s time limitations, as a reasonable juror could agree with
Miller that until she was transferred to another section, she could have been promoted at any time
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to Vice President.181
The court then analyzed the failure to promote claim based on the continuing violations
doctrine by comparing the methods used in two earlier Third Circuit cases, Jewett v. International
Telephone & Telegraph Corp.182 and EEOC v. Hay Associates.183 The Third Circuit believed that
Hay represented the proper method of analyzing whether a repeated failure to promote, where
promotion is not based on specific vacancies, constitutes a continuing violation.184 Under this
formulation, the court found that Miller sufficiently alleged a continuing violation, and her claim
for failure to promote was timely.185
The Miller case illustrates the problem with construing an act of discrimination or
retaliation as a discrete act as opposed to part of a continuing course of conduct, thus creating a
hostile work environment. Although Miller was decided before Morgan and Shepherd, the
problem continues because the court’s classification of the allegation can lead one plaintiff’s claim
to be barred by the statute of limitations while another’s is timely. This is especially prevalent in
the case of a failure to promote claim where the employer leaves the vacancy unfilled as opposed
to promoting someone other than the complainant to the position. Under the courts’ current
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interpretation, the employee would be on notice of the failure to promote at the time the position
is not filled (yet the position/title is never officially eliminated), which starts the clock for statute
of limitation purposes.
B. Hypothetical
Take, for example, an employee who refuses an employer’s request to participate in
conduct the employee knows is in violation of a law, rule or regulation. After the employee’s
refusal to participate, things begin to change at work. The employee is subjected to subtle acts of
harassment, such as: being left out of meetings; receiving less important work tasks; and getting
reprimanded for minor infractions while other employees receive no such reprimands for equal or
worse behavior. Then, the employee fails to receive a promotion that he was the most qualified
and next in line for. The employee can decide to ride it out and hope that over time things will get
better, look for another employment opportunity, or file a claim under New Jersey’s whistleblower
statute, CEPA.186
This is the point where things become murky under the law as written and applied by the
courts. The acts of harassment, which began after the employee refused to act in violation of the
law or rules or regulations at his employer’s request, would likely be considered a continuing
course of retaliatory conduct which, for statute of limitations purposes, would not accrue until the
last such act.187 Thus, if the acts of retaliation began three years prior to the date of filing, the
claim would still be within CEPA’s one-year statute of limitations so long as the last act occurred
within the past year. Each separate act would be aggregated and considered as one act of
retaliation.
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On the other hand, the failure to promote claim could be considered either an ongoing
course of retaliatory conduct, as in Miller, or it could be treated as a single discrete act, the date of
which would be the accrual date.188 This was the situation addressed by the Miller court,189 and
continues under the current state of the law. If the aggrieved employee was passed over for
promotion and a less deserving employee was promoted, then the adverse employment action is
clear and occurred on that date. The statute of limitations would be triggered as of that date,
leaving the aggrieved employee with either one year (under CEPA) or two years (under NJLAD)
to decide whether to file a claim. An employer, however, can be more subtle in their retaliation or
discrimination against an employee who was in line for a promotion to a vacant position by just
leaving the vacancy unfilled. This second situation leaves the aggrieved employee in the same
situation as the first (he still was not promoted because of an unlawful act of retaliation or
discrimination), but when is the statute of limitations triggered? The current state of the law tends
to point to the date that the aggrieved employee could have been promoted to the vacancy. This
lack of clarity puts the aggrieved employee in a precarious position: he can decide to file a claim
and run the risk of the court finding he was not the victim of an adverse employment action, or he
can wait to see if he or anyone else is promoted to the vacancy, thereby running the risk of
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becoming time-barred. These incongruent results are based on legal nuances that no aggrieved
party could be expected to understand, and which the courts have had difficulty determining.190
It is time for the New Jersey Legislature to step in and alleviate this discrepancy by
amending both NJLAD and CEPA so that all similarly situated aggrieved parties are treated the
same in workplace discrimination and retaliation claims.
VI. Proposed Amendments
This section will discuss proposals for legislative amendments to both NJLAD and CEPA
to end the confusion faced by the courts in differentiating between discrete acts of discrimination
or retaliation and acts that make up a hostile work environment.
When alleged discriminatory or retaliatory acts are related to an employee's protected status
or whistle blowing activity, discrete acts occurring outside of the statute of limitations should be
aggregated and not treated as time-barred. Forcing an employee to file a cause of action when she
may not be ready to take legal action because of the stigma that is attached, or the fear of potential
future acts of retaliation, is not the way to protect employees and “eradicate the ‘cancer of
discrimination’ in the workplace.”191 Not only are potential plaintiffs expected to discern what a
discrete act is, and which acts are included under the continuing violation doctrine, but employers
and courts are also without a clear answer. Therefore, amendments to both NJLAD and CEPA are
necessary to end the confusion caused by the application of Morgan’s framework.
Thus, in order to further the purpose of the two statutes by eliminating discrimination in
the workplace and encouraging employees to blow the whistle on unscrupulous employers without
fear of retaliation, the New Jersey Legislature should amend both to specifically allow for all acts
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of discrimination and retaliation (whether discrete or not) to be included as part of one “unlawful
employment practice” so long as the acts are substantially related as set forth in the test presented
by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Morgan.192 The following language should be added to
N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a) (NJLAD): “for purposes of determining whether the ‘continuing violation’
doctrine applies to any appropriate claim, all acts of discrimination or retaliation that are
substantially related to the protected status defined by the act shall be aggregated and deemed to
have occurred within the statute of limitations.” Likewise, the following language should be added
to N.J.S.A. 34:19-5 (CEPA): “the ‘continuing violation’ doctrine shall apply to any appropriate
claim, whereby all unlawful acts of retaliation prohibited under this act that are substantially
related to the protected whistleblowing activity shall be aggregated and deemed to have occurred
within the statute of limitations.” The added benefit of implementing these amendments will be
to further promote the adjudication of claims based upon their substantive merits as opposed to
procedural bars.
VII. Conclusion
The current state of the interpretation of New Jersey’s LAD and CEPA statutes has led to
confusion by the courts, employers, and employees, therefore generating inconsistent results. It is
time for the New Jersey Legislature to eliminate the current distinction between discrete acts and
those that make up a continuing course of conduct so that as long as the act of discrimination or
retaliation is linked to protected status or whistle blowing activity, all acts should be aggregated to
form the basis of a claim for statute of limitation purposes. As discussed throughout, the timeliness
of claims turned on this distinction rather than the substantive merits of the claim. NJLAD and
CEPA are meant to protect New Jersey employees from adverse employment actions based on acts
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of discrimination or retaliation.

The only way to reach the statutes’ overarching goals of

eradicating the “cancer of discrimination”193 in the workplace and to “protect and encourage
employees to report illegal or unethical workplace activities and discourage public and private
sector employers from engaging in such conduct”194 is to allow for the aggregation of discrete acts
of discrimination or retaliation when determining the accrual date for statute of limitations
purposes.
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